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7:50 Depart hotel to event venue 
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Opening Remarks & Keynote Speech 
8:00-8:30 Registration 
8:30-8:50 Opening Remarks  
• Sameh Wahba, Acting Director, World Bank 
• Kim Sang Bum, Vice Mayor, Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) 
• Kyung Hwan Kim, President, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) 
8:50-9:20 Keynote Speech: Managing the Unmanageable: Seoul’s Experience of Urban Transformation  
• Kwang-Joong Kim, Professor, Seoul National University 
9:20-9:25 Group photo 
9:25-9:40 Coffee break 
<Policy Session #1>  
Metropolitan Planning, Development and Urban Transformations 
 Description:  How do metropolitan cities handle rapid urbanization and prepare their cities for 
future urban growth? Experiences of metropolitan urbanization planning, land readjustment, and 
historic neighborhood regeneration focusing on planning, policy, regulation, finance, governance, 
private sector involvement and others. 
9:40-10:30 Moderator:  Kyung Hwan Kim, President, KRIHS 
Discussants: 
 Hon Didas Massaburi, Mayor, Dar es Salaam City Council 
 Kwang-Joong Kim, Professor, Seoul National University 
 Vijay Jagannathan, Secretary General, CityNet 
Rapporteur:  
 Jon Kher Kaw,  World Bank 
Presentations (15’ each) 
1. Seoul: Seoul’s Sustainable Urbanization Planning and Land Readjustment:  Myounggu 
Kang, Director General, International Urban Development Collaboration,  SMG 
2. Addis Ababa:  Mathewos Asfaw Bekele, Surrounding Oromia Integrated Development 
Plan Project Officer, Addis Ababa 
3. Paris:  Julie Nouvion, Member of the Paris Region Parliament 
10:30-11:00 Discussion, questions and answers 
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Rapporteur: 
  Roger Gorham,  World Bank 
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3. Nairobi:  Martha Muthoni, Urban Planner, Forward Planning and Secretariat Member for 
the Nairobi Integrated Urban Development Master Plan 
14:30-15:00 Discussion, questions and answers 
15:10-16:00 Presentations (15’ each) 
4. Seoul: Seoul Public Transportation Reform: Joonho Ko, Director of Megacity Research 
Center, Seoul Institute 
5. Dar es Salaam:  Challenges for Service Delivery in Dar es Salaam: Eng Mussa B. Natty, 
Municipal Director, Kinondoni Municipal Council 
16:00-16:30 Discussion, questions and answers 
16:40 Bus pick-up at Seoul Global Center Building 
16:50 Arrive at Bukchon Hanok Maeul 
17:00-18:15 Site briefing 
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20:30 Return to hotel 
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7:20 Depart hotel to event venue 
8:30-8:40 Welcoming Remarks  
• Chang Hyun Lee, President of Seoul Institute 
<Urban Systems #1>  
City e-Government 
 Description:  Integrated Smart Urban Management (iSUM) using ICT for accountability, efficiency 
and better service. 
8:40-9:40 Moderator:  Hyoung Gun Wang, Senior Economist, World Bank   
Discussants: 
 Representative from Addis Ababa (TBC)  
 Nicolas Ronderos, Director, Regional Planning Association, NYC 
Rapporteur: 
 Sangmoo Kim,   World Bank 
Presentations (10’-15’ each) 
1. Seoul:  Seoul e-Government toward Smart City: Sang Ok Choi, Professor, Korea 
University; 
 Jong Geun Kim, Director of Information System Planning, SMG 
2. WB-WeGO:  WB-WeGO city e-Government toolkit: Suzin Ahn, Program Director, 
Secretariat of WeGO 
3. Dar es Salaam:  Towards e government - the case of Dar : Hon Yusuph Juma Mwenda, 
Mayor, Kinondoni Municipal Council 
4. Ulaanbaatar: Baasanjav Sanjaa, Specialist in charge of information technology in Chief of 
mayor’s office of Ulaanbaatar  
9:40-10:10 Discussion, questions and answers 
10:10-10:30 Coffee break 
<Policy Session #2>  
Metropolitan Economy 
 Description:  Metropolitan economic development and restructuring – from planning to 
implementation 
10:30-11:50 Moderator:  Songsu  Choi, Senior Advisor, KRIHS 
Discussants: 
• Uma Adusumilli, Chief Planner, Mumbai, India 
• Hyoung Gun Wang, Senior Economist, World Bank 
Rapporteur: 
 Parul Agarwala, World Bank 
Presentations (15’ each) 
1. Accra: Samuel Aryee, Director of Finance, City of Accra 
2. Ulaanbaatar: Temuulin Enkhmunkh, Head of economic development agency  
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3. Bandung: Name & Title of Presenter(TBC) 
4. Paris: Andre Durbec, International Vice-president of the competiveness cluster Advancity 
(Sustainable City), Paris 
5. Seoul: Beonwook Kim, Senior Research Fellow, Incheon Development Institute; Sangdae 
Lee, Director, Gyeongi Research Institute 
12:00-12:30 Discussion, questions and answers 
12:30-13:30 Lunch hosted by the President of Seoul Institute 
<Urban Systems #2>  
Inter-Jurisdictional Coordination 
 Description:  Examples of inter-jurisdictional coordination and governance at a metropolitan level 
13:40-15:00 Moderator:  Julie Nouvion, Member of the Paris Region Parliament  
Discussants: 
 Hon Mayor Jerry Silaa, Mayor Ilala Municipal Council  
 Peter Ellis, Lead Urban Specialist, World Bank 
Rapporteur: 
 Augustin Maria , World Bank 
Presentations (10’-15’ each) 
1. Dar es Salaam:  Institution setup in Dar es Salaam: Hon Jerry Silaa, Mayor, Ilala Municipal 
Council 
2. Nairobi:  Eng Kinyua Wamugunda, Assistant Country Engineer, and Nairobi Metropolitan 
Services Improvement Project Liason Officer 
3. Paris:  Bertrand Lemoine, Director of Research, National Centre for Scientific Research 
4. Seoul, Case 1:  WoonSoo Kim, Senior Research Fellow, Seoul Institute 
5. Seoul, Case 2:  Metropolitan Governance - Administration and Finance: Hyeon-ho Kim, 
Director of Regional Development, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements 
15:10-15:40 Discussion, questions and answers 
15:40-16:00 Coffee break 
<Policy Session #3>  
Urban Think-Tanks 
 Description:  The role and function of urban think-tanks in planning and policy implementation 
16:00-17:20 Moderator:  Yeong Hee Jang, Vice President, Seoul Institute 
Discussants: 
• Peter Ellis, Lead Urban Specialist, World Bank 
• Bat-Erdene Batzolboo, Economic Development Agency, Ulaanbaatar(TBC) 
Rapporteur: 
 Sangmoo Kim,  World Bank 
Presentations (15’ each) 
1. KRIHS:  Jincheol Jo, Research Fellow, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements 
2. Guadalajara:  Luis Felipe Siqueiros, Technical Director, Guadalajara 2020 
3. SI:  Inhee Kim, Director of Planning and Coordination, Seoul Institute 
4. GRI:  Taekyung Kim, Research Fellow, Gyeongi Research Institute 
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5. RPA:  Nicolas Ronderos, Director, Regional Planning Association, NYC 
17:30-18:00 Discussion, questions and answers 
18:10 Move to dinner site via bus 
18:30-20:30 Dinner hosted by the President of KRIHS 
20:30 Back to hotel 
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May 1 (Thu) - Venue: Seoul Global Center Building 
 
 
8:10 Depart hotel to event venue 
<Service Delivery #2>  
Metropolitan Water and Waste Management 
 Description:  Examples of sustainable water supply, sewage treatment, and solid waste 
management 
8:30-9:20 Moderator:  Ellen Hamilton, Lead Urban Specialist, World Bank 
Discussants: 
 Kap Soo Kim, Vice Chairman, ISAN Corporation 
 Nairobi, Name and Title of Presenter(TBC) 
Rapporteur: 
 Jon Kher Kaw,  World Bank 
Presentations (10’-15’ each) 
1. Nairobi: Isaac Muraya, Deputy Director, Department of Environment 
2. Seoul, Water: Sustainable water supply of Seoul: Efficient management with the Revenued 
Water Ratio and quantity/quality control:  Young-june Choi, Director of Bureau of R&D for 
Water, Waterworks Research Institute 
3. Seoul, Waste: Smart Waste Management in Seoul : From Waste to Resource: Jae Min 
Song, Professor, University of Seoul 
10:20-10:40 Discussion, questions and answers 
10:40-11:00 Coffee Break 
11:00-12:00 Panel discussion on next steps by region 
Moderator: Victor Vergara, Lead Urban Specialist, World Bank 
 EAP:  Bandung, Ulaanbaatar and Ellen Hamilton 
 SAR:  Mumbai, Karachi and Peter Ellis  
 AFR:  Accra, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and  Roger Gorham 
 LAC:  Brazil, Mexico and Victor Vergara 
 WRD:  Barcelona, Paris, RPA and Sameh Wahba 
12:00-12:15 Wrap-up and closing remarks 
• Sameh Wahba, Acting Director, the  World Bank  
• Yeonsik Yoo, Director General, International Relations Bureau, SMG 
 
12:20 Walk to farewell lunch site 
12:30-14:00 Farewell lunch hosted by the World Bank 
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Design at Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Seoul 
National University. His teaching subject includes general urban 
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academia, Dr. Kim worked at Seoul Development Institute (now 
Seoul Institute) where he conducted research and practices on 
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design while directing the Department of Urban Planning and 
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Keynote speech at Global Lab on Metropolitan Strategic Planning, Seoul Global Exchange 
April 29, 2014. Seoul, Korea 
 
 
Managing the Unmanageable:  
Seoul’s Experience of Urban Transformation 
 
 
Kwang-Joong Kim (Seoul National University) 
 
 
A century ago, Seoul was under colonial ruling (1910-1945) without any ability of self- control. Some 
half century ago, Seoul was devastated by Korean War (1950-1953) and its daily survival was much 
dependent on foreign aid. Korea was one of the poorest countries with some $80 GNP/capita. Slums 
were rampant in the city center. People drank polluted water from neighborhood wells and rivers. 
Smelly sewage from houses and factories was discharged to the Han River. Bad air, overcrowding and 
congestion were normal life. Seoul was hardly a manageable city. 
 
From the 1960s and on, Seoul underwent an abrupt and phenomenal growth. The city hall was 
overwhelmed by intractable pressing problems virtually in every front of administration. Housing, 
sanitation, infrastructure, transportation, environment, social welfare and other public services – all 
desperately demanded a priority of public actions. The problems were so intense. It was as if Seoul 
had embodied one of the most acute contemporary urban challenges. Seoul tested the city hall – its 
ability to manage the unmanageable. 
 
Now, in daily routine, a 10-million mega city runs smoothly without noticeable interruption. No 
matter how persistent its unsolved problems may be, Seoul’s achievement is no small. No matter how 
pervasive its unintended consequences may be, Seoul’s transformation is a listenable story. How did 
Seoul do it? How did Seoul do it with a limited knowledge and scarce resources? What made once an 
unmanageable city turn around into a livable city? What are the secrets?  
 
Many different views are possible. But I think of: 1) leadership, 2) hardworking, 3) forward looking, 4) 
learning attitude, 5) institutional setting, 6) resource attraction, and 7) economic growth.  
 
 
LEADERSHIP 
 
It was a leadership from the top – top of the central government and top of the city hall. The president 
and city mayors were the leaders who charted the course of Seoul’s transformation. Throughout three 
decades of the 1960s-80s, South Korea was a highly centralized developmental state. The military-
background authoritarian presidents appointed Seoul mayors who were supposed to execute national 
development agenda. The vertical clarity of decision-making power was evident from the top down. 
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While being reported on a regular basis, the president paid an annual visit to the city hall in an 
obvious effort to maintain the efficacy of this nation-centric order. The Seoul comprehensive plans at 
that time began with President’s annual address, stating eloquently that the country must not afraid 
any hardships and barriers to open new chapters of modernized history. They viewed Seoul to be an 
economic engine as well as an icon of national growth. Seoul’s policy agenda was a local version of 
national counterpart. The avid followers of the president together with the appointed mayors made 
sure that any project of national importance must be completed.  
 
Within the city hall, the mayor’s power was absolute. Since local legislative body was non-existent 
until 1995, the mayor exercised the full power of city administration from personnel to budget. It was 
mayoral leadership that set a crystal-clear priority for bold actions. They rerouted the natural flow of 
the mighty Han River. They even lifted the elevation of whole Yeoido Island. Infrastructure building, 
slum clearance and urban renewal, development of housing complexes – all was realized under the 
‘commando construction’ catchphrase and the getting-things-done mentality that the mayor called for. 
  
It was far from democratic, participatory governance. Rather, the vision, philosophy and political 
views of the country’s leader and the mayor largely determined the nature and speed of urban 
management during this time. Under the national economic development agenda, their vision was 
clear, focused and directive. Seoul city governance has now become much more independent, 
democratic and participatory, yet it seems this leadership tradition is still at work.  
 
 
HARDWORKING 
 
It was a hardworking of public servants in the city hall who tamed Seoul’s phenomenal growth. Some 
two million people in 1960 reached ten million in 1988. It was like adding another city of Boston 
(some 600,000) every other year. The edge of the city was at constant expansion, mostly unplanned 
and without infrastructure. The city hall had to take care of daily lives of the enormous influx of 
people, battling against such miserable problems as shelter, water and sanitations, fire-fighting and 
disaster prevention. In coping with these challenges, according to an urban historian, the city hall was 
like a war room. The city officials worked day and night, without distinction between working days 
and free days. The city officials knew Mayor also would sleep on the military field bed in his office.  
 
It was through a hardworking of the city officials that the leadership was in motion to accomplish the 
national developmental agenda. Seoul’s technocrats crafted various city policies and drafted project 
plans in accordance with the direction of top decision makers and then implemented them amid 
pressing difficulties. Once top-down mission was delivered to the city hall, the tasks were planned, 
approved and completed at an astonishing quick-pace. Large-scale housing complexes, highways, 
bridges, tunnels, subways, roads and many other monumental constructions were realized in this way. 
 
This aggressive city making was marred by project accidents and corruption scandals. Due to these 
dark sides, only a few mayors served longer than two years during the developmental decades. Yet it 
is hard not to think of hardworking as a main cause of Seoul’s transformation. To change the city, 
Seoul never slept, from the top to lower technocrats. 
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FORWARD LOOKING 
 
Even amid poverty and mounting problems, Seoul was always far-sighted. It planned ahead with 
think-big, visionary mind. This attitude is another cause of Seoul’s achievement.  
 
As mentioned, the 1960s was an era of extreme poverty and formidable urbanization. Yet, Seoul did 
not lose the hope for the better future. The recent study let us know that the 1960 Seoul City 
Administration Plan and 1966 Seoul Comprehensive Plan already envisioned Seoul as a modern 
metropolis. Some downplay the impact of these plans in the sense that it lacked the specific guidance 
and thus left much room for the subsequent political arbitrariness. Further, the critics see that 
appointed mayors were more concerned with each one’s outputs rather than the continuity and 
consistency of the plans his predecessors devised.  
 
Nonetheless, it is true that Seoul’s forward-looking comprehensive plans played a guiding role in land 
use and infrastructure planning. Seoul comprehensive plans in the 1960s and 1970s show the 
remarkable consistencies with the current spatial structure and development patterns. The 
comprehensive plans envisioned Seoul 20 years ahead, laying out city-wide transportation networks, 
multi-centered growth and pre-planned outer expansions. It is noteworthy that the 1966 
comprehensive plan set aside a large suburban land for the Olympic venue, eventually becoming a 
1988 Olympic Park in the southeastern Seoul.  
 
Rapidly urbanizing metropolis like Seoul would not be fully guided by a long-range comprehensive 
planning approach. Comprehensive plans were at constant revision, as its 20-year population 
estimation turned out wrong within far-shorter time spans. The comprehensive plans alone were not 
able to guide the urbanizing Seoul. Indeed, according to a noted urban planner, the plan followed 
Seoul, not leading it. Yet, the comprehensive planning approach was at work in maneuvering the 
turbulent period of rapid population influx and territorial expansion. It was a forward-looking 
planning through which an explosive urban growth was kept in foreseeable order. 
 
 
LEARNING ATTITUDE 
 
After Independence in 1945, Seoul had little planning skills and capacity. Seoul’s urban planning was 
temporarily in halt during the 1950s, allowing the formation of unplanned slums and residential 
quarters. Technocratic capabilities and professional expertise were in utmost needs in controlling 
unleashed urban growth. Seoul cannot help but relying on the assistance from advanced countries. The 
willingness to learn from others was the main impetus of Seoul’s modern transformation. 
 
During the 1960s, Seoul discarded the colonial planning system and began to formulate its own. 
Modern urban planning methods were introduced by the foreign expertise mainly from the US. Their 
advices were subject to local adaptations and sometimes simply not worked. However, their in-site 
help was enough to inspire the government to realize the necessity of professional urban management. 
The founding members of Korea planning profession testify that the presidential order created the first 
planning schools at college and graduate levels in 1968. In the coming years, a number of Korean 
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professionals adventured to study in foreign countries for the advanced knowledge of city planning, 
many of them under the US aid programs. City officials were also enthusiastic in learning from others. 
They made a frequent foreign visit to learn new ideas and techniques for their urgent projects in 
charge. They went to Japan, the US and European countries for whatever they might think helpful and 
applied what they learned to Seoul context. Vertical property right exchange technique was learned 
from Japan. Impact fees were from the US, and Greenbelt from the UK, to name a few. Their trip 
reports were circulated to share the new knowledge with their colleagues.  
 
Some might think many of them were no better than the superficial copy, albeit not entirely so. 
However, the willingness and enthusiasm to learn was a vital asset for turning the unmanageable 
Seoul into a modern metropolis. It was through learning that planning capabilities and technical 
expertise were secured and embedded in daily practices. Now, more than 40 universities in Korea 
offer planning programs. Professional societies are also indispensable - sizable consulting industries 
on urban planning and engineering provide home-grown know-hows.  
 
 
INSTITUTONAL SETTING 
 
Seoul’s sustained hardworking was supported institutionally. Since the early 1960s, legal bases were 
laid out to support city planning and implementation. In 1962, the first Urban Planning Act was 
formulated to secure the public planning power on the issues of land use, infrastructure, communal 
facilities and urban development. Building Law was also enacted in the same year to introduce 
uniform building standards and permit system. The 1967 Land Readjustment Act replaced a colonial 
version to lay out new subdivision standards and process. The 1976 Urban Renewal Act supported the 
slum-clearance program of the city hall. Other laws regarding park, housing, transportation, 
infrastructure and land development followed. It was these legal bases that the city hall was able to 
overcome numerous legal challenges that they encountered throughout aggressive city-making years. 
Their plans and actions were justified and protected by these legislative back-ups.  
 
Another institutional setting was administrative support. Planning functions in the city hall have been 
increasingly refined and subdivided as Seoul changed quantitatively and qualitatively. Architecture, 
housing, urban renewal and development, park and open space, transportation, air, water, sewage, 
environment – all took their own units in so much as inter-departmental coordination became crucial 
for successful city governance. Yet, specialization and expertise tell only a half story of Seoul’s 
achievement. What seems also matter is flexibility. During the rapid growth decades of the 1960s-80s, 
the project-oriented, on-site special executive offices were often favored for the focused, maximized 
efficiency. Especially, since the 1995 local autonomy, the city organization has been under constant 
regrouping and renaming according to new mayor’s agenda. Mayoral task force and team-based 
organization also reflect this flexible institutional setting. 
 
These legal and administrative institutional supports were the ground on which the leadership and 
hardworking were at work in their full swings. Without legal bases and effective implementation units, 
any vision would have had a slim chance of realization especially in the turbulent policy environment.  
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RESOURCE ATTRACTION 
 
Resource attraction is another important aspect of Seoul’s achievement. Post-Korean War foreign aid, 
mainly from the United Nations and the US, supplied daily necessities for the survival of Seoullites 
and helped funding infrastructure and housing projects. However, Korea desperately needed more 
sizable financial resources for its planned growth towards a modern industrial nation. It is still a 
national memory that the government sent miners, nurses, farmers and even soldiers overseas to 
secure foreign loans and aid in order to fund highways and factories deemed essential for economic 
development.  
 
As economy grew, however, this initial reliance on foreign resources had been replaced by domestic 
funding. Still due to its meager public finance, Seoul was savvy to devise various measures to induce 
private investment. Through zoning change, volume incentives and tax benefits, Seoul mobilized 
private capital to finance the projects of land readjustment, urban renewal and housing development. 
From the 1980s, the city was able to mobilize the property owners and construction company to 
redevelop substandard residential quarters on their own self-financing formulae. A variety of public 
facilities, including terminals, tunnels and underground passages, were constructed by private money 
by offering the commercial use of space within a certain period of time. This type of public-private 
partnership has been a vital funding strategy to date. Pre-sale system of housing development is a 
unique Korean way of projects finance, which was only possible by the existence of the middle class 
with enough spending power. As financial commitment from the central government dwindled, the 
city budget plays an increasingly important role to finance the local projects. Seoul now takes 
virtually a full responsibility for its financial matters. Local taxes, impact fees and other incomes are 
main sources for the city expenses and debt payments.  
 
Relying too much on private interest generated criticism as to sacrificing environmental quality in 
favor of the developmental agenda. Nonetheless, this approach was clearly the driving force behind 
Seoul’s remarkable transformation in such a short period of time with scarce public resources. 
 
 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Finally, economic growth played a foundational role for Seoul’s transformation. Over the course of 
the last half a century, Korean was able to develop from foreign aid recipient to one of the 
international donors. Without economic growth, the central government could not have funded 
Seoul’s subways, infrastructures and cultural venues. Without a burgeoning middle class, Seoul’s 
massive land conversion and housing construction would not have been possible. Without growing 
city revenues, the city hall would not have been able to sustain ambitious urban projects. 
 
One the other hand, Seoul’s achievement is an outcome of a free market as much as that of public 
planning and management. In the poor years, the government and city hall led the urban change, but, 
as the economy grows, the private sector has taken a part to participating in the urban process. With 
its own resources to serve its interest, the private sector proposed various urban development projects, 
and they often put them into practice by securing property rights on their own. It was also the private 
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sector that guided consumer taste and offered a variety of choices in the real estate market. At 
numerous individual plots and commercial properties, the incremental transformation took place over 
the recent decades, making Seoul as it is today.  
 
It was economic growth that created a mutually-reinforcing relationship between public actions and 
urban outcomes.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In retrospect, what made Seoul’s achievement possible seems the aspiration of Korean people - 
aspiration to escape the poverty, aspiration to lift their living standards up to the satisfactory level, and 
aspiration to realize their full potentials so that they are a part of engaging global members. It seems 
this aspiration that motivated and energized Seoul city hall to manage the unmanageable.  
 
True, Seoul is not free from failures and regrets. Seoul’s hurried growth entailed the poor 
constructions, unjustifiable takings and irresponsible gentrification that caused the irrevocable 
sorrows and despairs of many people. Seoul’s historical legacies, cultural assets and environmental 
resources were often sacrificed by development-first strategies. Human values and the sense of place 
were overshadowed by modernist betterment. These experiences are two sides of a coin. Seoul thus 
can provide the lessons to rapidly growing world cities. 
 
We know, however, that we are talking about city planning and management, a deeply culture-
bounded local practice. Given the unique societal and urban context of each city, Seoul’s story should 
have different implications accordingly.  
 
16
17
<Day	2>
Apr	29	(Tue)	
[Policy	Session	#1]	
Metropolitan	Development	
-	Seoul’s	Sustainable	Urbanization	Planning
	and	Land	Readjustment
-	Bukchon	Conservation	Project	(2001~2004)
 
 
 
 
Myounggu Kang 
 
Company/Organization Seoul Metropolitan Government 
Position 
Director-General of International Urban Development 
Collaboration 
E-mail Address kang1116@seoul.go.kr 
Biography 
Myounggu Kang, a professor of Urban and Regional Planning at 
University of Seoul, is currently serving as Director-General of 
International Urban Development Collaboration in Seoul 
Metropolitan Government. He is leading the International Urban 
Development Collaboration (IUDC) of Seoul.  
At Boston Metro Area Planning Council, he was a leading 
member of a team developing a master plan called ‘MetroFuture 
2030’ to vision the future of the Boston metropolitan area and to 
unfold implementation strategies. Along the MetroFuture 2030, 
he led the development of ‘Regional Data Repository’ which is 
a data and map sharing on-line tool for collaborative planning.  
Dr. Kang studied Civil and Environmental Engineering (Urban 
major) at the Seoul National University, and holds Master of 
City Planning and Ph. D. in Urban and Regional Planning from 
MIT, USA.  
Title 
Seoul’s Sustainable Urbanization Planning and Land 
Readjustment 
 
18
1 
 
Seoul’s Sustainable Urbanization Planning and Land 
Readjustment 
 
 
Myounggu Kang (Seoul Metropolitan Government) 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
Rapid urbanization was threatening both life and nature 
 
Since the 1960s, due to the rapid urbanization and industrialization that took place in the City, a 
massive influx of population migrated to Seoul. At the time when existing infrastructure was 
insufficient, the average annual population growth of 270 thousand (22,000 persons per month) only 
worsened the situation of the livability of Seoul. The incoming population had no place to stay, so 
they could not help settling in the mountainside and by the streams. This led to the proliferation of 
substandard living environments which were also vulnerable to natural disasters such as floods and 
landslides. Also, this sort of settlement posed a greater problem: uncontrolled sprawl that destroyed 
the natural environment. These slums were causing serious deforestation of mountains and 
contamination of the streams 
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SOLUTIONS 
 
Set an order in land use; then build together benefit together 
 
Subsequently, the need to establish a spatial order arose, especially to control the uncontrolled sprawl 
that was destroying sustainability of Seoul. Thus, the Seoul Metropolitan Government announced a 
preemptive spatial framework for the sustainable development – the Seoul Metro Area Master Plan 
(1966), which was inspired by Greater London Plan (1944). This Master Plan aimed a compact, 
transit-oriented, and eco-friendly city. Seoul did not confine its plan to the administration boundary of 
those time. It tried to encompass the lives of future potential citizens (considering the growth), who 
will live, work, and commute beyond the City’s administrative boundary. 
 
 
     
<Figure 1> Seoul Metro Area Master Plan(1966)               Sustainable Urban Development 
 
What made Seoul different from other cities is implementation. Planning itself is important, but what 
makes it substantive is the very act of realizing the plan: implementation is more crucial than a good 
plan. A plan should be accompanied with a sturdy implementation system which should include 
financial considerations, and the process of persuading citizens and relevant stakeholders. 
 
In the initial stage of urbanization, land readjustment served as the major implementation tool, which 
laid the foundation for the city’s forthcoming smart and sustainable development. The purpose of land 
readjustment was 1) to set a spatial framework for sustainable development, 2) to secure urban land 
with public space including roads, school sites, parks, and so forth, and 3) provide public services 
including water, sewage, energy, and so forth. Securing public space was the first step toward smart, 
sustainable, and resilient urbanization.  
 
Land readjustment enabled the Seoul Metropolitan Government to put a grid pattern urban structure 
and secure much needed public space (e.g. percentage of roads was 8% in 1960) by receiving land 
contributions from citizens. At first, Seoul asked as little contribution as she could, for fear of citizen 
complaints. However, minimum contribution yields problems before the projects finished. For 
example, the roads were still insufficient and narrow so that many plots remained without 
accessibility of emergency services. The area confronted the necessity to re-expand public space. 
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Thus, from the late 1960s Seoul developed bold plans in order to embrace a long-term demand of 
public spaces and infrastructure for smart and sustainable development.  
 
Roads deserve mention. Although roads make up the highest percentage of land use in public space, 
they do not only refer to the surface lanes for automobiles. Roads, not only provide space for ground 
transportation, but also their underground space serve as the city’s artery, or blood vessel, for citizens’ 
life and work, delivering water and sewage, electricity, gas, telecommunication, and heating & 
cooling to every part of a city. Roads are also crucial infrastructure for resiliency providing access for 
rescue to emergency spots and place for people to escape. Accordingly, securing road space can be 
regarded as securing a network of necessary public space for the quality of citizens’ lives and the 
sustainable and resilient urban community. 
 
 
     
(a) Before                                   (b) After 
<Figure 2> Sooyu Land Readjustment: Spatial Reframing 
 
 
 
  
 
<Figure 3> Sooyu Land Readjustment: Land Use Change  
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Although residents contributed their land, in return, their land — which was previously unusable — 
would be developed into an urbanized land equipped with proper infrastructure, resultantly rising in 
land value that benefitted the owners. In other words, residents and the city would ‘build the city 
together,’ and then ‘benefit together’ the development gain that comes from building a well developed 
city. 
 
In the initial stage of land readjustment in the early ‘60s, most of the project finance relied on public 
budget from national subsidy and municipal bond issuance. After the late ’60s, almost 100% for the 
project finance was covered by the sales of the portion of owners’ land contribution, instead of public 
budget.  
 
 
  
<Figure 4> Securing public space by citizens’ contribution Road : Artery and Lifeline 
 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENT 
 
Sustainable Metro Area Planning 
established a land use framework as a guide for future growth. 
secured public space for public services (e.g., transit, water, energy, internet, etc.) and resiliency  
(e.g., emergency access and escape space, etc.) 
set a growth limit to protect nature from sprawl and citizens from disasters (e.g., flood, land slide,  
etc.) 
 
Land Readjustment 
was the key implementation tool to realize the plan. 
laid the ultimate foundation for Seoul’s smart and sustainable development as 40% of Seoul  
(140km2) became urbanized through this tool. 
provided urban land and infrastructure for citizens’ life, work, learn, play, and move. 
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<Figure 5> Land Readjustment Projects during early urbanization 
 
 
TIMELINE  
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Bukchon Conservation Project (2001~2004) 
 
 
Hyun-Suk Min (Seoul Institute) 
 
 
ISSUE 
 
Up to the 1980s, all developments in Bukchon had been strictly regulated by the robust Hanok 
(traditional Korean housing) preservation policy. However, a casualty caused by the collapse of a 
Hanok amidst the flood in the summer of 1990 brought about fierce opposition of residents against the 
existing Hanok preservation policy. As a response, the City (Seoul Metropolitan Government) eased 
building height restrictions in the area. This de-regulation served as a momentum for a series of multi-
family housing developments, thus accelerating the destruction of Bukchon’s landscape. 
 
 
  
<Figure 1> Bukchon: Location & Landscape 
 
 
SOLUTIONS 
 
With Hanoks renovating into multi-family houses, the de-regulation brought the destruction of 
uniqueness in Bukchon's traditional landscape. The new developments with high density burdened the 
old narrow alleys and aging infrastructure. At last, a community organization, ‘Bukchon Preservation 
Group’ requested a solution for Bukchon’s debilitating circumstances through the ‘Saturday Date with 
the Mayor of Seoul’ on Sep. 4. 1999. This marked the beginning of the collaborative process 
involving residents, experts, and the City to solve the problem of Bukchon.  
First, relevant government officials and resident representatives created ‘Bukchon Taskforce,’ a 
public-private consultative group and the City’s Housing Bureau formed the ‘Bukchon Project Team’ 
dedicated to the project. The Bukchon Project Team served as the project manager, collaborating with 
Jongro-Gu (borough) and the SH Corporation. After the creation of the Bukchon Taskforce, Seoul 
Institute provided a road map for the Bukchon Conservation Project and the City formed a general 
consensus by opening policy meetings and community hearings. Finally the City announced the 
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mayoral order No. 1002 (October, 2000) for the conservation of Bukchon. 
Following the mayoral order No. 1002, the City pursued the ‘Hanok Registration Program' to 
motivate residents' participation for the Bukchon Project. This policy was to support the conservation 
activities just for Hanoks, through a voluntary registration system by Hanok owners. The City also 
revised the City’s Building & Construction Ordinance in order to create a legal basis for the project. 
The City opened the ‘Field Office for the Bukchon Project’ to inform residents of possible 
administrative support in connection with the Bukchon Project. Furthermore, the City purchased 
several Hanoks in danger of being destroyed at market price and made use of them as a cultural center, 
museum, etc. These efforts, in conjunction with streetscape improvement projects on Bukchon’s 
major alleys, contributed to making Bukchon one of the most favorite tourists' attractions in the City 
of Seoul. 
 
 
 
`  
 
<Figure 2> Most Favorite Tourists’ Attractions in Korea 
 
 
ACHEIVEMENT 
 
In the 1990s, due to the de-regulation policy, the number of Bukchon’s Hanoks rapidly dropped from 
2,000 to 900. However, the Bukchon Conservation Project decreased the speed of Hanoks' destruction, 
improved the conditions of Hanoks, and rejuvenated the traditional streetscape of Bukchon.  
The Bukchon Project, not only improved the physical environment of Hanoks and the alleys in the 
neighborhood, but also elevated the area’s economic, social, and cultural value. Bukchon received the 
UNESCO Asia-Pacific Heritage Award for Culture Heritage Conservation (Award of Distinction 
among 5 Categories) in 2009. 
 
        
<Figure 3> Improved Conditions  
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<Figure 4> Rejuvenated Landscape 
 
Undoubtedly, the area has been recognized as a valuable attraction with the continuous flow of 
visitors. Non-governmental organizations are also visibly carrying out community activities to 
preserve the unique environment, recognizing the historic and cultural value of Bukchon. The real 
estate value has climbed from 5.5million KRW per 3.3㎡ in 2001, to 20~40 million KRW by year 
2014. 
 
 
SYSTEM of IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The Bukchon Project was executed with the collaboration with the City, residents, and experts. 
Bukchon Project Team supported the renovation and purchase of Hanoks with Jongro-Gu and the SH 
Corporation; residents led tour programs with NGO; and Seoul Institute established the Bukchon 
Conservation Master Plan with the City, reflecting residents' opinions  
 
 
<Figure 5> Governance of Implementation 
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BUDGET 
 
Following the City’s Hanok Conservation Ordinance, the City subsidized up to 30million KRW and 
loaned 20million KRW. 358 Hanoks were registered in 2001~2005. The City subsidized 6.7billion 
KRW for 224 cases and loaned 2.2billion KRW for 116 cases. In 2001~2005 the City spent 7.7billion 
KRW to purchase 12 Hanoks and 6 non-Hanoks. 
Streetscape improvement projects were carried out in Bukchon’s major alleys where Hanoks were 
concentrated. 2.3billion KRW was spent to reorganize the sewerage system, remove utility poles and 
wires, and repave the roads in Gahoe-dong 31 and 11. It cost 5.3billion KRW to improve the streets of 
Bukchon-gil (road) and Gyedong-gil. 
 
 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
After the Saturday Date with the Mayor of Seoul in 1999, numerous discussions and debates took place 
before the start of Bukchon Project in 2000. Bukchon Taskforce, a public-private consultative group 
held 3 official meetings to discuss the underlying issues for the project. The results were reported to the 
mayor three times. In the meanwhile, Jongro-Gu office also held 2 official meetings to identify the 
needs in the area. Especially, the mayor held two meetings to persuade the residents against the Bukchon 
Project. 3 public meetings were scheduled, yet 2 were cancelled due to opposition. To motivate residents 
to voluntarily participate in the Bukchon Project, the City suggested the Hanok Registration Program 
and opened a Field Office in Bukchon. Furthermore, the City purchased several Hanoks in danger of 
being destroyed at market price.  
 
 
 
<Figure 6> Communications with residents 
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SUMMARY 
 
The Bukchon Project significantly proved that preserving Hanoks, instead of destroying them for 
immediate profits, can bring much more benefits by elevating the area’s future value. Even though 
there was a number of both supporters and opposers regarding the project, the City could gain the 
trust of the residents through continuous dialogue and persuasion. Also, the execution of the project 
based on voluntary participation contributed to minimizing opposition from residents. 
The success of the Bukchon Project was followed by the Hanok Declaration in 2008. It paved the way 
for the expansion of Hanok conservation policies to all areas of Seoul. In 2012, Seongbuk-Gu’s 
Hanok Conservation Ordinance was adopted and spurred the Hanok conservation movement at an 
area-specific level. The Bukchon Project also influenced the nation-wide Hanok preservation and 
fosterage policy by the central government. The National Hanok Center was established in 2010 and 
the Hanok Promotion Law is being drafted.  
 
 
TIMELINE 
 
This timeline shows the development of the Bukchon and Hanok Conservation Policy starting with 
the ‘Saturday Date with the Mayor of Seoul’ in September 1999, the 2008 Hanok Declaration, and up 
to now. 
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A Driving Force for Sustainable Development and Remarkable 
Change, Seoul Metropolitan Subway 
 
 
Seungjun Kim (Seoul Institute) 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
Surface tram played a more pivotal role in urban transport for the first seven decades since Korea 
opened its ports to foreign trade. It entailed a direct shift from walking to rail travel, transcending the 
days of carriage. Since the 1950~1960s, the supply of buses and taxis as well as jeeps and trucks used 
during the Korean War led to increased surface traffic. Slow trams occupied road space at ground 
level and caused speed reduction for other transport modes which is more flexible in dealing with 
urbanization. As a consequence buses replaced the role of surface tram as they did in other major 
cities in the world. Buses then became the only mode of public transportation but they alone did not 
have the capacity to cope with fast urbanization, leading to growing demands for new transport 
schemes by the late 1970s.  
From the 1960s, the Korean government began a national development scheme which promoted 
industrialization in the vicinity of Seoul. This meant Seoul had to find space to accommodate the 
massive influx of population into the city and prepare public transport modes for people to travel to 
their workplace. The drastic population growth (increased more than three times from 2.45 million in 
1960 to 10 million in 1990) created a rapid rise in traffic demand, a higher share of car use, and an 
increased travel distance, attracting more investments in the transport sector. 
 
 
SOLUTION 
 
Based on the judgment that expanding road network alone could not alleviate traffic congestion, Seoul 
Metropolitan Government (SMG) gave positive consideration to the use of underground space in the 
urban environment. A decade before the construction, the first plan for a subway project was laid out, 
followed by several revisions and in-depth researches to determine the best routes and the project’s 
feasibility. The construction of the Line 1 launched after an agreement between Korea and Japan on 
providing loans and technological assistance for the project. While the first line was intended to serve 
mainly single central area, Seoul’s newly revised master plan was based on the idea of having three 
urban cores to resolve the concentration of population in the Northern region and this led to the 
decision of building a new subway line that links the three cores. Line 2 brought about a great impact 
in Seoul’s spatial structure, creating a corridor of business centers and universities locating along its 
route, all within a short period of time. As one of the most heavily used metro lines in the world, it 
serves more than 1.5 million people on a daily basis, contributing to environmentally friendly and 
sustainable growth of Seoul. Phase 1 of Seoul Metropolitan Subway project continued to the mid ‘80s, 
including the building of two lines that pass through main metropolitan corridors joining each other 
crosswise. Although other projects came to a halt due to financial difficulties after adding Line 3&4, it 
has left a substantial impact on today’s structure of Seoul by laying out a spatial framework that still 
remains solid to this day. 
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<Figure 1> Seoul’s Subway Network 
 
Due to constant overcrowding in Seoul, the capacity of Line 1~4 soon hit their limits. The ridership of 
Seoul Metropolitan subway was increasing 9~16% every year and the load factor was reaching 300%. 
When a development boom was accompanied by inflation, congestion was becoming a serious social 
problem. Against this background, the city government promoted Phase 2 construction consisting of 
the extension of Phase 1 network and additional new lines and thereby established a rail-based public 
transport system. As of late, the city is working on underground high-speed railway network which 
would link the greater Seoul metropolitan area and its inner-city cores, as well as Light Rapid Transit 
(LRT) that would reach out to unserved areas to foster balanced development throughout Seoul. 
 
In the early stage, local opposition to subway construction from people who live nearby arose due to 
poor understanding of the project. After the opening, the competition ensued because of easy access to 
subway stations and profit returns from property development. In some cases political pressure was a 
determining factor in the design of subway routes and surplus stations or stations within walking 
distance from another station were built. Now hailed as “Super Highway" or "Best Subway System", 
Seoul’s subway has evolved throughout the city’s growth by establishing smart user environments and 
technological innovation. 
 
 
 
<Figure 2> Light Rapid Transit (LRT) Plan             <Figure 3> High-Speed Railway Plan 
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Key success factors for Seoul Metropolitan Subway are as follows: 
- Seeking technological assistance from foreign countries based on exhaustive assessment on 
local technology 
- The government’s full support, implementing at national level 
- Saving construction costs through timely execution from planning to execution  
- Full-fledged administrative support involving traffic restrictions in the center for timely and 
efficient construction. 
- Strategic investments in facility based on a future-oriented outlook 
- Ensuring affordability in the fare system 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Although struggling under the burden of high initial construction cost, Seoul Metropolitan Subway 
functions as a driving force behind the city's sustainable development and remarkable change leading 
economic activities as well as providing opportunities for high-density office and commercial 
development around subway stations. Recently Seoul Metropolitan Subway is upgraded by one notch 
not only delivering a vital transport service for its citizens but also providing primary public spaces 
for cultural and social activities. With establishment of comprehensive and innovative management 
system through years of cumulative experience and technology, the network ensures timely and safe 
service and convenience for every passenger. The result of such efforts is shown the average daily 
ridership reaching 7 million and the modal share of 36%. 
Established to tackle congestion and overcrowding of population and functions, Seoul’s subway 
network has 40 years of history today. Boasting the world-class urban railway system, Seoul is now 
passing on its knowledge and technology in developing countries by offering consultation and 
engaging in projects. 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 4> Modal Share Change in Seoul 
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TIMELINE 
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Seoul Public Transportation Reform 
 
 
 
Joonho Ko (Seoul Institute) 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
Commenced in July 2004, Seoul's public transportation reform has drastically improved the systems of 
bus route, fare and management. It has drawn attention and gained appreciation worldwide from other 
cities and international organizations such as UITP. Seoul has had a number of domestic and 
international visitors coming to Seoul to learn from lessons and knowledge behind its successful 
transportation reform. 
The implementation of the 2004 transportation reform helped Seoul establish a human-oriented 
transportation system as shown in the modal split of its public transport reaching 64.3%(2010), stepping 
up the city’s transportation and global competitiveness. 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
Before the reform, Seoul used to suffer from serious transport-related problems induced by the 
increasing number of registered automobiles including single occupancy vehicles and the scarcity of 
parking space. Majority of citizens, though, did not expect the city government to find an effective cure 
for the chronic distress. In addition to the heavy traffic, overheated competition among bus operators 
combined with the opening of urban rail network affected bus ridership negatively, putting the bus 
industry on a downslide. However, authorities’ early actions were mainly ad-hoc measures that turned 
out unsuccessful and further worsened the problems in the long run.  
 
 
<Figure 1> Conditions of Bus Industry before the Public Transportation Reform 
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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Against this backdrop, the bus reform schemes aimed at mitigating urban traffic congestion and 
reinforcing Seoul's global competitiveness through the promotion of public transportation use with a 
new city bus system.  
 
Key goals of the reform include: 
- restructuring of routes: demand-oriented route designing centered on trunk and branch routes 
- reforming fare system: a shift to distance-based fare system from the previous independent 
and flat fare system, establishment of a fair fare system by making intermodal transfers free, 
promotion of transportation card use, 
- reorganizing bus operation: Route redesigning with the introduction of the semi-public bus 
operation system, securing financial transparency with joint revenue management, reducing 
profit disparity between bus operators, provision of employment security for bus drivers, 
introduction of a route bidding system to improve bus service 
- ensuring bus-centric road operation: improvement of reliability and speed, enhancement of 
carrying capacity 
- enhancing user support: establishment of democratic governance, encouraging civic 
participation in decision-making, building a scientific bus operation system, upgrading bus 
fleet 
 
 
 
<Figure 2> Highlights of Bus Service Reform 
 
 
CONSTRAINTS AND OBSTACLES 
 
Ahead of July 2004 reform, Seoul's transport authority had sought to implement a pilot project in the 
Northeast region of Seoul to handle prospective congestion following the removal of the Cheonggye 
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elevated highway. However, the ambitious attempt did not take off because of opposition particularly 
from bus companies. It took about one year for the reform to fully resume after conducting negotiations 
with stakeholders. The table below summarizes main interests of different stakeholder groups. 
 
Stakeholder Groups Main Issues 
Bus operators 
 Property right (route patent) infringement, inconsistency in the city's 
policies (often revised with a new political period) 
 Preference to the current system 
Bus drivers  Job safety (anxiety over unemployment from route adjustment and less buses in operation) 
Citizens  Ipact on their businesses from relocation of bus stops from the street side to median lanes 
District authorities  Lack of administrative guidelines in response to civil appeals 
Police Agency  Safety of using median bus lanes and related complaints from citizens 
Transit operators  Impact on the profitability of neighboring cities' metro operators caused by the new integrated fare system 
MPs, city and district 
councilors 
 Complaints from bus companies, bus drivers and citizens from their 
constituencies 
 
 
ACTION 
 
To coordinate the reform, a civic expert was assigned as the Director for Transportation Policy and the 
entire workforce of Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) was involved under the supervision of 
Transport Improvement Taskforce. Also established was "Transport System Reform Support 
Taskforce", a research support team consisting of researchers of Seoul Development Institute among 
others. 
 
Meanwhile after the unsuccessful Northeast area pilot project, SMG formed “Bus Reform Civic 
Committee” to encourage active civic participation after gathering citizens’ opinion on the delay in the 
reform process. Established in August 2003, the committee, made up of 4 members from civil 
organizations, 3 from bus companies, 8 from transport-related academics and 5 from city council and 
other related entities, was an independent organization that comprised the most important of interested 
parties in the bus reform. Through these discussions, SMG devised measures to restructure the bus 
routes with citizens’ convenience and financial stability of bus companies in mind. 
 
SMG made persistent efforts to come to terms with interested parties. During negotiations with bus 
companies, it held workshops with representatives from bus companies, academics and local officials. 
Measures taken in the negotiation process also included official letters to 16,000 bus drivers to make a 
case for the bus reform and 27 special training sessions for drivers. Finally, SMG settled an agreement 
through the cooperation with police agency, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Incheon 
city government and urban railway operators.  
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Passenger Automobile Operation Business Act was revised to secure legal ground for the joint 
management of revenues, a key part of the quasi-public operation system. As for some of the contested 
routes, it was decided to limit the validity of operation license for each operator up to six years along 
with the introduction of route bidding system. To stabilize the operation of bus companies, subsidies 
are provided by SMG.  
 
 
<Figure 3> Organizational Structure and Roles for the Bus Reform 
 
 
RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
 
With the implementation of quasi-public operation system, the city bus network has transformed to a 
passenger-oriented mode of transport that offers stable and pleasant bus travel environment. Also, the 
installation of median bus lanes led to a significant improvement in bus travel speed. The introduction 
of transportation card allowed scientific management of public transit. These achievements resulted in 
the increased passenger satisfaction level, ending a drop in the ridership that was in constant decline 
prior to the reform. In addition to these achievements, a distance-based fare system, which imposes 
incremental fares in accordance with travelled distance, was introduced contributing to the equity and 
efficiency of transport service. 
 
 
 
<Table 1> Bus Travel Speed Before & After the Reform 
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<Figure 4> Public Transport Ridership (1,000 passengers/day) 
 
 
FINANCING AND COST 
 
To provide financial support for the project, private investments were encouraged to minimize the 
public financial burden. For example, costs for developing transportation information system (\124.9 
billion) and construction of major transfer centers (\5 billion) including the ones in Yeouido and 
Cheongryangri were entirely sourced from the private sector.  
 
SMG provides subsidies for bus companies to make up for their profit shortfall from quasi-public 
operation and free transfers. The financial aid from the city government totaled \80 billion in 2004 and 
\200~300 billion every year onward.  
 
  
<Figure 5> Trends in Bus Operation Deficit and Financial Support 
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TIMELINE 
 
Reform groundwork 
- Jul 2002: Announced the intent to reform the public transportation 
- Aug 2002: Organized Seoul Public Transportation Taskforce 
- Oct 2002: Established "Transport System Reform Support Taskforce", a research support team at  
Seoul Development Institute 
- Jan 2003: Conducted benchmarking studies on international transport system including U.S. and  
Brazil 
 
The North-east area pilot project and failures 
- Mar 2003: Announced the Northeast Area pilot project 
- May 2003: the Northeast Area project suspended 
 
Making adjustments and reaching agreement 
- Aug 2003: inauguration of the “Bus Reform Civic Committee”  
- Aug 2003 ~ June 2004: discussion with stakeholders and accommodated their opinions 
- Oct 2003: Establishment of Korea Smart Card Corporation  
- Feb 2004: reached an agreement on joint revenue management between SMG and bus companies 
 
Public Transport Transform  
- Jul 1 2004: launch of the reform 
- Jul 4 2004: Mayor’s release of public apology for unsatisfactory arrangements 
- Aug 2004~now: ongoing upgrades of the reform including policy revisions to stabilize the operation  
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Without such endeavors made to reach a social consensus among stakeholders by organizations built 
on public-private partnership such as “Bus Reform Civic Committee”, results would have been different 
from what we see today. Particularly, directing policy revisions based on compromises between the 
city’s realistic choices and researchers’ ideal vision laid the framework for Seoul’s successful transport 
system. As demonstrated by Seoul’s experience, collective planning and consensus building among 
stakeholders is instrumental to the establishment of the new structural arrangements. In addition, 
experience from the early pilot operation in the Northeast region tells us that depending on the issues, 
a full-fledged systemic reform can turn out to be more effective as it can produce a significant synergetic 
effect. 
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ISSUES 
 
Since 1985, the supply rate of personal computers has been increased 17.6 times from 5% in 1985 to 
86% in 2009. Until the mid 1960s one every ten households had a phone subscription, but increased to 
0.54 person per household in 1997, then to 1.56 in 1997, and finally by 2007 1.34 persons per 
household had phone connection. This can be attributed to the increasing mobile phone use since the 
1990s. It is shown in the fact that the number of phone subscriptions was 0.2 per every 100 in 1990 
before it became 105.5 as of 2011. In regards to the broadband internet subscription, the number of 
subscription moved from 8.2 in 2000 to be radically increased to 35.9 as of 2011, multiplying 4.4 
times. 
 
  
<Figure1> Number of Phone Subscription  
Per Household 
 
<Figure2> Trends in Landline Phone/Mobile 
Phone/Broadband Subscriptions 
As a means to achieve governmental efficiency and innovation, transparency and accountability, 
accessibility of government and civic participation, Seoul's e-government policy tried to encourage 
the active engagement of citizens in ICT, while building a cooperative relationship between the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government and citizens. 
 
 
SOLUTIONS 
 
Solution 1: Government-driven promotion and Seoul’s compliance 
 
Since 1978 when the first Basic Plan for Administrative Computerization was laid out, introducing 
ICT technology to public administration became a main agenda. Computerization, a preceding step to 
informatization, promotes use of computers in managing large data. During this era computing 
practices was of the punched card computing level, so the range of computerization was limited to 
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simple tasks and compiling or processing databases. The focus was on developing inter-governmental 
network and thereby increasing work efficiency. The major policies and projects undertaken by the 
central government since 1978 to promote e-government included the first and second Administrative 
Task Computerization Plans, Rule of Administrative Task Computerization, National Basic 
Computing Network Project and Administrative Computing Network Project Plan. Despite such 
endeavors, however, very few investors were willing to get involved because of the low level of 
technology and uncertainties. Seeing the benefits of computerization projects and e-government, SMG 
was not discouraged to continue its investment and collaboration with the central government, 
allocating financial and institutional supports on e-government projects from the early stage. For 
example, Information System Planning Bureau provided a critical assistance in gathering the citywide 
compliance. 
 
Solution 2: Coordination and Directing via the SMG Information System Planning Bureau 
 
The informatization project incrementally expanded in scope and scale since the city’s early efforts in 
1971 to computerize main administrative tasks such as budgeting, accounting and personnel affairs. In 
compliance with such national plans as Basic Plan for Administrative Computerization and Act on 
Promotion & Usage of Computer Network in 1987, SMG took an initiative for e-government 
transformation through its own plans. 
Incomplete implementation in the early days of digitalization projects, contrary to the expectations, 
created extra workload at the city hall. While sharing of administrative information was partially 
made possible, data management by individual agencies was still scattered. As a response to the 
calling for a full integration of e-government services across different administrative divisions, 
Information System Planning Bureau (ISPB) was launched in pursuit of administrative efficiency. 
ISPB serves as the main implementation body that directs comprehensive planning and coordination 
of e-government projects. As of now, it consists of 4 directors, 23 teams and 4 divisions housing 989 
staffs in total. 
 
  
<Figure3> Creation of Informatization  
Planning Division (1999) 
<Figure4> Organization of Information  
System Planning Bureau (2013) 
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Solution 3: Enhanced Paradigm: From efficiency to transparency and citizen participation 
 
Following the early efficiency-driven approach towards e-government, Seoul has moved its focus 
since the 2000s to digitalization and disclosure of administrative information to promote the citizens’ 
participation and transparency in the administrative process. Measures taken to foster administrative 
efficiency include “Seoul e-Tax System”, “120 Dasan Call Center”. Innovative measures are in 
operation for the transparency in the city administration, for instance “Seoul Child Care portal” and 
“Oasis,” an online policy suggestion system. 
 
  
<Figure5> Online Tax Site <Figure6> Online Citizen Participation Site 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
Number 1 in Global E-Governance Survey Ranks for five consecutive years 
A research study conducted by Rutgers University has identified Seoul as the top city in the field of 
e-government. Seoul was ranked number 1 in terms of usability, service, and citizen participation, 
making Seoul’s municipal e-governance one of the best among cities in OECD countries. 
 
Ranking City Score 
1 Seoul 84.74 
2 Prague 72.84 
3 Hong Kong 62.83 
4 New York 61.1 
5 Singapore 58.81 
6 Shanghai 57.41 
7 Madrid 55.59 
8 Vienna 55.48 
9 Auckland 55.28 
10 Toronto 52.87 
 
<Table 1> Rutgers’ Global E-Governance Survey Ranking (2009) 
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Disclosure of Public Information 
“Open Government 2.0” is built to push forward civil administrative services based on participation 
from the citizens, disclosing city documents and extensive public database. 
The system is expected to leverage the mutual understanding between the citizens and the SGM staffs 
along with the prospective growth of the industry which would benefit from public data, establishing 
Seoul as one of the most advanced smart cities in the world. 
 
 
<Figure7> Open Government Systems: SMG Document Center/ Open data Center  
 
Another faucet of e-government’s achievements is demonstrated by online government information 
access, document issuance, tax administration, and welfare service. 
 
Improvement in ICT Work Environments and Realization of Smart City 
Upgrades are ongoing in ICT facilities to ensure sustainability in smart governance. SMG is working 
on setting up the groundwork for smart administrative service to meet a variety of administrative 
demands through its enhanced administrative support and integrated management. For example, the 
management of U-work Center boasts its world-class ICT facilities to improve employee’s 
productivity and help tackle low fertility rate.  
 
 
SUCCESS FACTORS 
 
There are factors both within and outside the SMG behind the success of e-government in Seoul. 
Some key external factors in Seoul’s rise as an e-government powerhouse include the central 
government’s ambitious promotion and supply-driven strategies in the ‘80s. Also instrumental was the 
cooperative implementation between the central government and SMG. As for the internal factors, 
institutionalization of controlling body played a vital part. Collaborating with the staff on ideas and 
resolutions, Mayor’s strong commitment and keen interest in the open and smart administration was 
another crucial factor.  
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Sustainable water supply of Seoul:  
Efficient management with the Revenued Water Ratio and quantity/quality control 
 
 
Young-june Choi (Waterworks Research Institute) 
 
 
CHALLENGE 
 
The modern water supply in Seoul started in 1908. However, over the course of Korean War after the 
Japanese colonial period, most of the waterworks in Seoul was severely damaged or destroyed. After 
the ceasefire in 1954 for the subsequent five years, restoration project of waterworks was launched 
with the help of UN aids and state funds. During the 1960~70s, demand for water increased 
exponentially with the drivers such as fast urbanization and industrialization following the five-year 
economic development plan of Korea. At this point, necessity of expanding water facilities became 
evident.  
 
 
<Figure1> 1908 Tukdo Water Treatment Plant  <Figure2> Noryangjin WTP during the Korean War 
 
Since the amount of water supply in Seoul at that time was insufficient, majority of citizens had to 
suffer a shortage of drinking water. In particular, extra administrative support was needed in 
vulnerable regions with lower water pressure such as highlands and extremity of the water supply line. 
Under these circumstances Seoul Metropolitan Government sought to secure funds through foreign 
aids, issuing municipal bonds and state subsidies. This effort allowed a full commitment in investing 
on water production facilities along with water supplying facilities and auxiliary water treatment 
plants. 
 
Thanks to the steady expansion of production facilities and the slowing of population growth, water 
supply began to stabilize. By 1988, the service rate reached 98.8%, risen from 59.8% in 1960. As for 
the unstable supply on hillsides, 122 pressure booster stations were built by 1989 to mitigate the weak 
water pressure, along with the installation of 11 major water reservoirs completed during the three 
years from 1985 to 1987. Owing to such investments, the water storage capacity as increased to 
648,000 m³, doubling the previous capacity.  
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<Figure3> Facility Capacity and Service Rates in Seoul 
 
Thanks to the large facility investments and extra support in underserved areas, the service rate in 
Seoul reached 99% in 1989. Following the establishment of the groundwork for reliable supply 
system, there was a transition in the policy agenda for waterworks, to "improvement of waterworks 
management via control of water quality and increase of revenued water rate(RWR).“ 
RWR is an indicator to measure the percentage of billed water as a share of net water produced. 
Higher RWR means reduced tap water loss, positively affecting financial viability of water utilities by 
increasing water sales and cutting unnecessary operating costs. As more citizens began to consider the 
quality of tap water rather than its quantity, technological and administrative means were devised to 
address these demands. 
 
 
SOLUTION 
 
Higher RWR means higher efficiency in water production and supply, besides the financial benefits in 
utility management. Thus, improvement in quality/quantity of water is attainable by enhancing RWR. 
For this reason, Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) arranged both administrative and technical 
support to increase RWR. Among the technical support made by SMG were: 
- Construction of reservoirs for balanced water pressure 
- Replacement of old pipes  
- Leakage monitoring via small-scale block system and measurement of minimum night flow  
- Leakage surveillance 
- Prioritized management of regions with pressurized water supply 
- Establishment of GIS with database on locations and materials of pipes 
The administrative side of improvements includes: 
- Inauguration of a special organization for the RWR improvement project. 
- Meticulous evaluation scheme for institutional performance based on RWR 
- Detection of fraudulent activity such as faulty metering and illegal connections 
 
To reduce the amount of non-revenue water by cutting water leakage and quality improvement, Seoul 
was divided into 2,037 small blocks. It was based on these block systems that pipe network was 
designed, old pipes were replaced or repaired and leakage detection was carried out. This facilitated 
relentless monitoring and repairs of leakage as well as intensive repairs of deteriorating pipes and 
maintenance of unused pipes, helping to reduce water loss in regions with lower RWR. 
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 <Figure4> Block System                     <Figure5> Pipe Replacement and RWR 
 
The deteriorating infrastructure such as grey cast iron, steel, and PVC pipes installed before 1984 was 
the cause of frequent water leakage. As a solution to this problem, the old pipe network was replaced 
with more durable material such as stainless steel or ductile cast iron, which in turn helped to increase 
RWR. 
 
   <Figure6> Indirect Water Supply System Using Water Reservoirs 
 
In the past, pressure boosting was the method of choice for facilitating water supply to highlands. 
However it was responsible for water hammer and leakage due to the unreliable water pressure. As a 
solution to this issue SMG transformed its plan for water supply to a passive delivery system, 
undertaking an expansion of service reservoirs that involved the construction of 104 new reservoirs 
(2,420,000 m3 in total). Such commitment paid off, as shown in the increased RWR from the reduced 
leakage and reliable supply. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The result of such dedication against water losses was a significant improvement RWR of Seoul, 
currently at 94.5% (2013), increased from 55.2% of back in 1989 when Office of Waterworks was 
established. Following the downsizing of production since 2000, SMG transformed old water 
treatment plants into recreational space for citizens such as Seonyudo Park. As one of the benefits 
from the establishment of efficient management system and cost reduction, the water tariffs remained 
the same between 2001 and 2009. The reduction of water losses ultimately led to the improvement in 
water quality, as it requires facility upgrades and efficient management of waterworks. 
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 <Figure7> Trends in RWR                <Figure8> Monitored Items and Water Quality 
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Sewage: from pouring to processing 
 
 
Kap Soo Kim (Isan Corporation), Young Ran Kim (Seoul Institute) 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
The Han River, once so fouled by industry and sewage that dead fish lined its banks. The river fell 
victim to rapid industrialization as textile mills, chocolate factories and city sewer systems poured 
waste into its waters. In the early 1960s, Seoul with a population of 3million, was experiencing 
serious water pollution in the Han River. Swimming was banned in the lower streams of the Han 
River Bridge and fish with deformed spine started to appear. BOD figures surveyed in 1963 showed 
241ppm at Cheonggyecheon Stream and 124 ppm at Jungnangcheon Stream. Moreover, regions 
around these rivers and streams were subject to frequent floods during the monsoon season. 
 
 
 
<Figure 1> Seoul's Water Pollution in the early '60s 
 
 
SOLUTIONS: WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND CONDUITS  
 
The issue of building a wastewater treatment facility in Seoul materialized in 1962. Since the country 
had neither the money nor the technology to construct a large-scale sewage treatment facility, foreign 
credit was brought in: AID (Agency for International Development) provided the credit and 
D.M.J.M(Daniel Mann Johnson ＆ Mendenhell) provided the technology. First and foremost, plans 
for the construction of Cheonggyecheon Sewage Treatment Plant was drawn up in 1962, a credit 
request plan was submitted to the Ministry of Construction in August 1964, and a request for 
government-guaranteed credit was handed in to USOM in Korea. When a credit payment guarantee 
bill was passed at the National Assembly in April 1966, a credit agreement worth $3.5 million was 
signed with the Agency for International Development in July 1967, and in September the same year, 
a technical service agreement was signed with D.M.J.M. The main design for the plant, completed 2 
years later in 1969, was approved by USAID in Korea in November 1969, and ground was broken in 
June 5, 1970. Inflation, however, brought about shortages in funds, and a credit agreement of 
additional $2.8 million was signed in 1974, increasing the total amount of foreign loans to $6.139 
million.  
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Construction of the Cheonggyecheon Sewage Treatment Plant was completed in September 21, 1976, 
after 6 years and 3 months of breaking grounds. The opening of the first end-point sewage treatment 
facility in the country brought in a new era of sewage treatment, servicing an area of 362,670m²in 
Seongdong-gu, Gunja-dong and Songjeong-dong regions. The facility had a capacity of 
150,000㎥/day, which was equivalent to the ability to treat sewage generated by 1.3 million people in 
5,600ha of Cheonggyecheon Stream watershed area. The facility employed activated sludge process 
to reduce the average BOD from 330ppm to 19ppm or lower, and the average SS from 330ppm to 
30ppm or lower, before wastewater is discharged into Han River. 
 
The next end-point treatment facility to be set up was Jungnangcheon Sewage Treatment Facility, and 
construction began in December 27, 1975. A total of 10.15 billion won, $4 billion in foreign credit 
from Gradley Brandt Bank and 6.15 billion won from domestic sources, was put into the construction 
of the plant with a sewage processing capacity of 210,000㎥/day. The plant also employed activated 
sludge process to treat sewage.  
 
The difference between Cheonggyecheon and Cheonggyecheon Plants was that the latter plant was 
able to take care of 60% of its electricity requirement with 1,400KW of electricity produced using gas 
generated during sewage treatment. Construction of Jungnangcheon Plant, capable of reducing BOD 
from 250ppm to 20ppm or less, and SS from 300ppm to 30ppm or less, was completed in September 
10, 1979. 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 2> Four Major Treatment Centers 
 
As it became mandatory for local autonomies to establish master plans for sewer system improvement 
with the revision of the law in 1982, Seoul came up with its Master Plan in 1983. The Master Plan 
was different from plans of the 1970s in that it was legally binding, one of the very important changes 
of the 1980s. The City's 1983 Master Plan for Sewer System Improvement called for wholesale 
extension of sewers, based on the estimation that the population would grow to 10.417million by 2001. 
The plan was to increase the total length of conduits to 9,582,188m by 2001, by adding 1,967,249m of 
combined sewer, and 555,289m of sanitary sewer to the 7,059,650m of sewer already in place. 
Meanwhile, the plan would also have the existing 612,300m of round culverts and 117,477m of box 
culverts repaired. 
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Conservation of Han River entered a new era in the latter half of the 1970s with the construction of 
Cheonggye and Jungnang Sewage Treatment Facilities. But their capacity to process was far behind 
demand and required continuous efforts for improvement.  
 
After reviewing the benefits of regional and area-wide approaches to building treatment facilities, the 
City decided to divide the entire drainage area into four zones, namely, Jungnang, Tancheon, Gayang 
and Nanji, to build four sewage treatment facilities. 
 
One of the most urgent tasks for the City throughout 1980s and 1990s along with construction of new 
end-point treatment plants was the improvement of the sewage conduits that intertwined the city like a 
spider web. The Sewer Conduit Improvement Plan was designed to install 403Km of new conduits, 
repair 574Km of existing conduits and bury 250Km of separate conduit lines from 1984 to 1987.  
There had been efforts to improve sewage conduits in the previous decades, but projects in the 1990s 
were much more advanced in technical terms. Most conduits are hume pipes. These pipes, although 
strong enough to withstand time, have problems of ground water seeping into the conduits or 
wastewater leaking out of them due to bad connection with main pipes or other pipes blocking the 
insides of these pipes, causing soil pollution. Although the more desirable way would be to do away 
with septic tanks altogether and send wastewater directly to treatment plants through conduits, the 
tanks are still in use for lack of a complete conduit system to enable such a process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 3> Sewer System of Seoul City 
 
Though once considered aversive and unpleasant, sewage treatment centers as well as retarding basins 
can serve as eco-friendly public space. They can provide recreational areas for citizens, by 
constructing a covering structure and the park on it. Tancheon Eco-Park is just one example.  
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<Figure 4> Conversion of Water Treatment Plants into Parks 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENT:  
 
Now the City boasts 100 percent conduit coverage, near 100 percent excreta treatment through the 
sewage system, and near 100 percent sewage treatment capacity. 
 
Thanks to the aforementioned efforts by the City, water pollution of the Han River improved 
dramatically in the late 20th century. BOD figures for water at Paldang, in comparison to the 
environmental standard of 1ppm, went down from 1.4ppm in 1981 and 1985 to 1.0ppm in 1990, and 
up again to 1.5ppm in 1998. Figures for Noryangjin, vis-a-vis its standard BOD of 3ppm, is now 
improving after going from 3.92ppm in 1981 to 4.7ppm in 1985. BOD for Gayang is also improving. 
The figure for 1998 went below the environmental standard of 6ppm at 4.8ppm, after going up to 
11.4ppm in 1985 from 10.41ppm in 1981. 
 
 
<Figure 5> Han River Water Quality 
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REGULATION, ORGANIZATION, FINANCE, AND SMART WATER SYSTEM 
 
Basic laws specifically pertaining to the sewer system were first enacted in August 30, 1966 under the 
title, Wastewater Act. And the Wastewater Service Department under the Bureau of Construction was 
upgraded in December 31, 1976 to the Bureau of Wastewater Service including the newly established 
Wastewater Administration Department and the Flood Control Department. 
 
The City drew up the first phase plan slated for completion in 1986, 5 years after the project's 
initiation in 1982, with the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympiad in mind. Knowing the two 
international events would draw the world's attention to Seoul, the City could not afford to host the 
games with the smelly sewage flowing into mainstream Han River through Tancheon Stream near the 
Sports Complex. The plan, incorporated as part of the Comprehensive Han River Development 
Program, was designed to increase processing capacity from 360,000㎥/day in 1981 to 2.60M㎥/day, 
by increasing complete treatment and primary treatment capacities to 1.2M㎥/day and 1.4M㎥/day 
respectively by 1986.  
 
With the revision of the law, the City of Seoul enacted the Ordinance on the Use of Sewer System in 
December 31, 1983, and started levying usage charges beginning October 1, 1983, which has become 
the main source of budget for the sewer system, as annual revenue from the sewerage charges 
increased from 49.5billion won in 1985 to 132.2billion won in 1998.  
 
 
<Figure 6> Sewage Information System 
 
 
VISION 
 
Envisioning ever-pleasant and safe living environments for its citizens, the SMG is striving to build a 
future-oriented sewerage network. It is ultimately to increase benefits of water resources and safety of 
urban water infrastructure bearing in mind conservation of the ecosystem, introduction of advanced 
technology and realization of circular economy. 
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Smart Waste Management in Seoul: From Waste to Resource 
 
 
Jae Min Song (University of Seoul) 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
The dramatic growth of waste generation in Seoul, 
fueled by its rapid urbanization and economic 
growth, posed a serious public concern. Thus 
securing proper waste management system 
became the city’s priority agenda.  
For example, Nanjido, the biggest landfill site at 
that time on which the most of the city’s waste was 
dumped since 1978, went beyond capacity. Ninety 
two million tons of waste during its lifespan of 15 
years until late 1992 resulted in two massive 
mountains of garbage measuring about 100 meters 
in height.  
 
The landfill method of those days was open 
dumping, vulnerable to harmful leachate and other 
pollutions. Not only was it a serious threat to the 
environment, it also had significant health impact on residents. The waste in the landfill also often 
ignited and claimed lives, causing 1,390 fire incidents in total during the 15 years, including one big 
blaze which lasted for 45 days. The exhaustion of landfills and its negative impact on the environment 
and sanitation necessitated a new scheme for managing waste, however, securing sites for waste 
processing facilities would be met with local resistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Figure 2> Nanjido Landfill before the Closure 
<Figure 1 > Trends in Waste Generation and  
Seoul’s Population 
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SOLUTIONS 
 
Steps to waste management include waste avoidance, reduction, recycle, recovery and final treatment. 
Recognizing waste as a resource, shifting away from simply focusing on its treatment as in the ’70s, 
Seoul’s waste management policy aims at maximizing eco-efficiency of waste management and 
achieving a sustainable economy. Various measures have been introduced for sustainable waste 
treatment as shown below. 
 
 
 
<Figure 3> Major Waste Policies of Seoul 
 
 
Solution 1: Volume-based Waste Fee System: VWFS 
 
Introduced in 1995, Volume-based Waste Fee 
System was the first market-based incentive 
system to be introduced in the environment 
sector. It made a huge contribution in reducing 
Seoul’s waste and promoting recycling. Based on 
the “polluter pays” principle, it charges according 
to the amount of waste discharge through pre-paid 
standard bag. The implementation of the system 
changed public awareness toward waste disposal, 
drawing attention to such issues as the urgency of 
waste reduction and the costs of waste treatment. 
Increased perception of the system changed 
people’s behavior and resulted in support from 
citizens. 
 
 
 
<Figure 4> Standard Garbage Bag 
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Solution 2: Sudokwon Landfill Site 
 
Pressed with the increase in waste generation in the late ‘80s and the limited capacity of the landfill in 
Nanjido, Seoul had to secure additional space and come up with a long-term plan.  
In order to tackle these issues, Sudokwon 
Landfill was built to treat waste from Seoul 
and adjacent area. Being the biggest dump site 
in the world as well as the first sanitary 
landfill to be built in Korea, it takes care of 
13,400t (as of May 2013) of household and 
industrial waste from 24-million population 
every day since its opening in 1992. Operated 
by Sudokwon Landfill Site Management 
Corporation (SLC), Sudokwon Landfill is an 
exemplary case of regional cooperation. For 
its reliable management system and energy 
recovery project it is praised for its endeavor 
to ensure the safe treatment of waste and to 
create a circular economy in waste 
management. 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
Decreased waste disposal & increased recycling:  
 
Compared to that of 1990, per capita trash disposal in 2010 was decreased 57%. Recycling was 
increased 1850%. Such a change spawned economic and environmental benefits, including 26-year 
increase in landfill lifespan and lowered of treatment costs. 
 
    
<Figure6> Daily Waste Generation Per Capita       <Figure7> Trends in Types of Waste Treatment 
Constructing city of circular economy: 
 
Seoul city has been encouraging waste-energy technologies recently and thus have been actively 
promoting innovative use of waste such as production of refuse-derived fuel (RDF) with inflammable 
<Figure 5> Regions of Waste Source for Sudokwon  
Landfill Site 
67
waste, landfill gas utilization and biogas generation from food waste. Sudokwon Landfill Gas 
Electricity Generation Project 950MW, registered as a Clean Development Mechanism project, is an 
exemplary case of this. It saves 1,210,000 T of CO2 every year, expected to create future economic 
profit from sales of carbon credits. 
1990  2010 
Open Dumping 
 
Sanitary Landfill & Park 
   
<Figure 8> Nanjido: Then & Now 
 
Eco tourism:  
 
Formerly a massive dump site, Nanjido has been transformed into eco-friendly outdoor space 
featuring cultural and educational facilities. After a process of restoration works, five different theme 
parks were created, attracting 9.8 million visitors every year. The landfill gas is recycled to provide 
heating for the local community. In addition, Sudokwon Landfill site is also going through 
construction to build an eco-themed park, called Dream Park. 
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